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UTAHR. APP. P. 24(A)(1) STATEMENT OF ALL PARTIES

1. Murlyn Craig Reese, Plaintiff and Respondent.
2. Tingey Construction Defendant and Respondent.
3. LWP, Solutions, Inc. real-party-in-interest and Petitioner.
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this case by virtue of granting Petitioner
LWP, Solutions Inc.'s Petition for Discretionary Interlocutory Appeal pursuant to
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 5.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW & STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution

require that agreements reached in the course of mediation be reduced to some
form of writing.
"Statutory Construction is a question of law and is reviewed by the Court de
novo. When interpreting court rules, we apply our rules of statutory construction
with an understanding that rules, like statutes, are passed as a whole and not in
parts or sections. [0]ur primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the
rule-making body and to render all parts [of the rule] relevant and meaningful."
Cox v. Krammer. 76 P.3d 184, 187 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (internal quotations and
citations omitted)(alterations original).
2.

Whether Utah Code Annotated § 78-3 lb-8 (2002) requires that all

discussions among participants at a mediation be kept confidential so that such
mediation discussions cannot be used to prove the existence of an alleged oral
agreement.
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"Matters of statutory construction . . . are questions of law that we review for
correctness." Anderson v. United Parcel Service 96 P.3d 903, 906 (Utah 2004).
3.

Whether the trial court erred when it interpreted Utah Revised Statute

Section 78-3lb-8, as recognizing "confidential" and "non-confidential"
components of mediation discussions. "Matters of statutory construction . . . are
questions of law that we review for correctness." IdL
III. PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN TRIAL COURT
The issues set forth herein were preserved in the trial court by virtue of a
request to immediately certify the trial courts ruling for interlocutory appeal.
R213: 45:24 - 46:6. When the trial court denied the request, Petitioner filed its
Petition for Discretionary Interlocutory Appeal pursuant to Utah Rules o f
Appellate Procedure Rule 5. R205.
IV. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES & REGULATIONS

Utah Code Ann. § 78-3lb-8 (2002).
Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution, Rule 101.
Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The trial court ordered that LWP Solutions, Inc. 's ("LWP") counsel be
deposed and forced to testify regarding statements and negotiation that took place
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

within the confines of mediation in direct violation of Utah Code § 78-3 lb-8
(2002) which deems all mediation discussions confidential. The purpose of this
deposition was to prove the existence of an oral agreement between LWP and Mr.
Reese that Mr. Reese alleged was reached and which LWP denies. LWP filed a
petition for discretionary interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, which this Court granted.
LWP Solutions, Inc. asks this Court to reverse the trial court's ruling and
find that all mediation discussions are confide ntial and cannot be revealed to third
parties even if introduced to prove the existence of an oral contract. Moreover,
LWP asks that the Court find that the rules regulating Alternative Dispute
Resolution ("ADR") require mediation participants to reduce t heir agreements to
written form so as to avoid disputes such as the one between Mr. Reese and LWP.
Allowing participants to enforce alleged oral agreements made within the confines
of mediation would undermine the confidentiality requirements of mediation and
would contravene ADR rules that allow participants to disengage in settlement
discussions at any time prior to the execution of a written document. Moreover,
allowing for an exception to confidentiality to prove oral agreements would create
an exception that swallows the rule.
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A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves statutory construction of Utah Code Ann. § 78 -31b-8; the
Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution, Rule 101; and Rule
408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence so as to determine whether the rules of
confidentiality surrounding mediations precludes the introduction of evidence from
within a mediation to enforce a purported oral agreement reached therein. The trial
court erroneously allowed Mr. Reese to introduce evidence rega rding an alleged
oral agreement and this Court should reverse and remand with direction that Mr.
Reese's Motion to Enforce Settlement be dismissed with prejudice for lack of
admissible evidence in support thereof.
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW & DISPOSITION
Plaintiff Murlyn Craig Reese filed a motion to enforce a settlement
agreement that he alleged was reached during a mediation with Defendant, Tingey
Construction and LWP Solutions, Inc., third-party lien holder and real party in
interest. A hearing was held on Mr. Reese's motion to enforce. R213. At the
hearing, LWP asserted that Rule of Evidence 408, Rule 101 of the Utah Rules of
Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution and Utah Code Ann. § 78 -31b-8
prohibited the disclosure of discussions ma de during a mediation. R213: 3:25;
6:20. The trial court was not persuaded by LWP's arguments and found that there
were "confidential" and "non-confidential" components of mediation and that Mr.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Reese was free to introduce evidence regarding the "non -confidential" portions of
mediation. LWP renewed its objections and asked the court to certify the matter
for interlocutory appeal and the trial court denied this request. R213:45:24 -46:6.
The trial court provided Mr. Reese with the option to either call LWP's counsel to
the stand at that very moment or depose her at a later date. R213:43:25 -44:12. Mr.
Reese chose to depose LWP's counsel and the hearing concluded. R213:44:13 -15.
Subsequently, LWP filed a motion to intervene seeking to clarify its role i n
the suit and to ensure that it had standing to appeal the trial court's ruling. R135.
Mr. Reese objected to LWP intervening in the suit. R157.
LWP also submitted a proposed order to the court in an attempt to solidify
the breadth of the court's ruling. In this proposed order, LWP made it very clear
that LWP's counsel would not be required to testify in violation of attorney -client
privilege. R150-152; R170-73. Mr. Reese again objected. R140.
During the hearing, Mr. Reese's counsel purported that one of his secretaries
who sat near the foyer during the mediation among the parties overheard LWP's
counsel speaking with her client and could testify in support of an oral agreement.
R213: 40:6-12. Mr. Reese also sought leave to testify about the conversations that
he "overheard." Ibid. LWP filed a motion with the court seeking exclusion of this
evidence on the ground that it was protected by attorney -client privilege and this
privilege was not waived by an eavesdropper. R.8 fn 2 - R9; R170-73.
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Despite LWP's objections, the trial court executed the proposed order
tendered by Mr. Reese. R179-181. This order did not explain with any detail the
scope of the deposition of LWP's counsel. R179-181. Most importantly, the
executed order was silent on the issue of whether LWP's counsel would be
required to violate attorney-client privilege and testify about her discussions with
her client. Rl 79-181. It also failed to rule on the issue of whether opposing
counsel's secretary would be allowed to testify about what she claims she
overheard LWP's counsel say. R179-181.
The court also failed to rule on LWP's motion to intervene in the suit prior
to entering the above-described order. R135; R138 and R197-198. As a
consequence, LWP was forced to file a motion for extraordinary writ to protect its
interest. R195. As a precaution, LWP also filed a motion for discretionary
interlocutory appeal and a motion to quash the deposition notice for Ms. Acosta,
LWP's counsel.1 R185-187. Ultimately, the trial court allowed LWP to intervene
in the suit and LWP's petition for discretionary interlocutory appeal was granted
by the Court. R197-198; R205-206.

1

LWP Solutions, Inc. also filed a Petition for Extraordinary Writ and Rule 8A
Emergency Relief Petition. R.195. This request was denied by the Utah Supreme
Court. R202.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

VI. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about May 24, 2000, Mr. Reese was invovled in a work-related
accident when he fell from a third-story balcony while attempting to raise a
toolbox from the ground using an electrical cord. R2. Mr. Reese had leaned on a
temporary railing while attempting to raise his tools. R2. The temporary railing
gave way and Mr. Reese fell. He sustained significant injury to his leg. R2. As
Mr. Reese was in the course and scope of his employment, all medical expenses
related to this injury were covered by Mr. Reese's employer's workers
compensation insurance. R69. The insurance carrier retained LWP Solutions, Inc.
("LWP") to administer the payment of workers compensation benefits to Mr.
Reese and to pay medical bills as they were incurred.2

2

LWP Solutions, Inc. would like to clarify its role in this litigation as there appears
to be come confusion. LWP is not an insurance provider but is a third-party
administrator that has been hired by the Utah Property and Casualty Guarantee
Association ("UPCIGA"). UPCIGA has taken over payment of Mr. Reese's
workers compensation claim in light of the fact that the workers compensation
insurance company, Fremont Compensation Insurance Group/Freemont Indemnity
Group, was liquidated in 2003. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-28-202 et seq.
(2006)(setting forth the role that UPCIGA plays in circumstances involving
insolvent insurers). While LWP has been making payments to Mr. Reese and to
others on his behalf, the money for such payments has been provided, at least in
part, by UPCIGA or are funds to which UPCIGA is entitled to as a result of
Fremont's liquidation. Accordingly, UPCIGA has a lien on proceeds recovered by
Mr. Reese in his litigation against Tingey Construction. LWP is acting as
UPCIGA's agent in this matter and is afforded the same protections and
obligations as UPCIGA pursuant to Utah Statute.
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Subsequently, Mr. Reese retained his own counsel and filed suit against
Tingey Construction ("Tingey"). R2. In that suit, Mr. Reese argued that Tingey
had negligently constructed the temporary railing and that had the temporary
railing been properly constructed, he would not have fallen. R2. Tingey defended
the suit by stating that Mr. Reese was at fault and that his recovery was reduced by
his own negligence. R16.
In the fall of 2005, Mr. Reese contacted LWP and asked for a break down of
the money it had paid to Mr. Reese in workers compensation benefits and medical
bills. Mr. Reese then asked if LWP would reduce the amount of its lien so as to
facilitate settlement of Mr. Reese's suit against Tingey. At Mr. Reese's urging,
LWP agreed to participate in a mediation of the dispute between Tingey and Mr.
Reese that was to occur on December 30, 2005. R127. Paul Felt acted as the
mediator.3 R77.
Near the end of the mediation, LWP was presented with a Memorandum of
Understanding that purported to set forth the terms of the agreement with the
parties. LWP refused to sign because the memorandum contained a term to which
3

Over objection and at the trial court's insistence, LWP submitted an affidavit of
its counsel recounting the events that took place at the mediation from her
perspective. R126-13. The submission of this affidavit at the hearing should not
be seen as a waiver of LWP's objection to being asked to provide testimony
regarding what occurred at the mediation. LWP introduced this evidence only
because the trial court insisted. LWP has taken caution to limit reference to the
any information contained in that affidavit.
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LWP had not agreed. LWP's counsel advised Mr. Reese, Tingey and the mediator
that there was no agreement with LWP. Tingey left the mediation and LWP and
Mr. Reese remained to further negotiate a settlement. Ultimately, no reso lution
was reached and LWP left the mediation without executing the Memorandum of
Understanding or any other written document. LWP informed Mr. Reese that no
agreement had been reached prior to leaving.
Following the mediation, LWP wrote Mr. Reese several letters reiterating its
position that no agreement had been reached at the mediation. R91 -94 Moreover,
LWP cautioned Mr. Reese that pursuant to Lyons v. Booker, 982 P.2d 1142 (Utah
Ct. App. 1999), mediation discussions were confidential and could not be used by
Mr. Reese to enforce any alleged oral agreement. R91 -92. Despite LWP's
warnings that the content of the mediation was confidential, Mr. Reese filed a Joint
Motion to Enforce Settlement.4 R54.
The trial court heard oral argument on the motio n to enforce settlement on
May 22, 2006. R213. At the hearing, LWP reasserted its argument that the parties
had not reached any agreement. LWP further argued that Mr. Reese was
4

Below, Mr. Reese made much of the fact that Tingey Construction Inc.
("Tingey") joined in the motion to enforce. LWP had very little contact with
Tingey during the mediation and never discussed the terms of any purported
settlement with Mr. Reese with any representative of Tingey. Consequently,
Tingey can only testify about what Mr. Reese told it or about its own suppositions;
but it possesses no first-hand knowledge of any discussion between LWP and Mr.
Reese. Its joinder in the motion to enforce is of limited significance.
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prohibited from revealing confidential mediation discussions pursuant to Uta h
Code Ann. §78-3lb-08.
The trial court found as follows: "Mediation discussions contain both
"confidential" and "non-confidential" discussions and that LWP's counsel would
be deposed about the mediation. R179-181. The trial court held that "the scope of
the deposition shall consist of the content of the mediation, including the process
of the mediation and conversations and agreements that were made during the
mediation." R179-181. LWP sought an interlocutory appeal to prevent its counsel
from being deposed and to preserve the confidentiality of the mediation among the
parties. R206.
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mediation discussions are confidential pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78 3 lb-08, Rule 101 of the Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute
Resolution, and Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The trial court erred
when it ordered that LWP's counsel could be deposed regarding confidential
mediation discussions. The courts are not to delve into confidential mediation
discussions to determine whether an oral agreement was reached during mediation.
The bright-line rule is that oral agreements made during a mediation will not be
enforced by the courts and that parties need to protect themselves and reduce all
agreements to some form of writing prior to the end of the mediation. See Lyons
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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v. Booker, 982 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). LWP refused to execute any
"Memorandum of Understanding" that was presented to it at the end of the
mediation because the memorandum contained a term to which it did not agree.
LWP communicated its refusal plainly to the others at the mediation. This is
conclusive proof that the parties do not have an enforceable agreement since
parties to mediation may withdraw at any point prior to the executi on of a written
summary of the agreement.5
VIII. ARGUMENT
In his motion, Mr. Reese attempts to enforce a settlement agreement that
was never reached. It appears that the Plaintiff and the Defendant came to some
sort of resolution during the mediation, but it is clear that no such agreement was
reached with LWP. R88. Prior to leaving the mediation on December 30, 2005,
counsel for LWP made it clear to all involved that LWP did not agree to the terms
of the settlement set forth in the document drafted b y the mediator, Paul Felt. R88.
5

If required to do so, LWP could introduce evidence to show that there was no
meeting of the minds between LWP and Mr. Reese. The lack of a meeting of the
minds between the parties is evidenced by LWP's refusal to execute the document
presented to it at the end of the mediation on the grounds that it contained a term to
which it did not agree. Upon review of this document and the specific language
therein, LWP recognized immediately that Mr. Reese had incorrectly set forth an
agreement between the two parties. LWP notified the participants immediately of
the error but Mr. Reese insisted that this term had been fully discussed even though
LWP was certain that the term had not been discussed. The parties failed to reach
any meeting of the minds and the alleged oral agreement is unenforceable on this
ground as well.
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LWP's counsel refused to execute the written agreement because it contained a
term to which LWP did not agree. Ibid.
Mr. Reese argues (1) that LWP is not entitled to the benefits of
confidentiality in Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lb-8 because it was not a "party" to the
suit and because the portion of the mediation needed to prove the existence of an
oral agreement is not confidential, and (2) that no written document is necessary to
bind a party to alleged agreements made in mediation, because other jurisdictions
enforce oral agreements in mediation.
Mr. Reese is mistaken in each assertion and the trial court erred in allowing
him to introduce evidence regarding an alleged oral agreement and erred in
ordering that LWP's counsel be deposed regarding confidential mediation
discussions. This Court should reverse the trial court's ruling that LWP's counsel
be deposed regarding confidential mediation discussions. The Court should
remand with direction that Mr. Reese's motion to enforce be dismissed with
prejudice for lack of admissible evidence to support his claim.
A. LWP's Participation in the Mediation Entitles it to Treat all Portions
of the Mediation as Confidential.
1. Both the Benefits and the Burdens of Confidentiality Apply to LWP.
Below, Mr. Reese argued that Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lb-8 (2) did not apply to
LWP. Mr. Reese argued that the confidentiality requirement set forth in Section
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78-3 lb-8(2) only prohibited admission of confidential statement at a subsequent
"trial of the same case or same issues between the same parties." R213:14:9-24.
Mr. Reese's legal argument is flawed. Utah Code Section 78-3 lb-8 does
provided at (2) that "[n]o evidence concerning the fact, conduct, or result of an
ADR proceeding may be subject to discovery or admissible at any subsequent
trial...," but it also provides that confidentiality applies to all persons present at the
mediation, including lien holders such as LWP. Id.
Subsection (4) provides "no person attending an ADR proce eding .. . may
disclose or be required to disclose any information obtained in the course of an
ADR proceeding." Id The plain language of this statute states that the facts,
conduct, or result of a mediation are confidential. There is no limit as to w ho is
bound by the mandate of confidentiality because the legislature used the word
"person," not parties, as Mr. Reese argues.
Moreover, if the Court were to adopt Mr. Reese's reasoning it could be
argued that LWP would not be entitled to the benefits of confidentiality under Utah
law because it was not named as a "party" to this suit at the time of the mediation.
This is an absurd result and is not what the Legislature intended. As the plain
language of § 78-31b-8(4) provides, everyone who participates in mediation must
adhere to the confidentiality requirements.
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2. All Mediation Discussions Are Confidential.
Similarly, there is no basis in law or fact to support the trial court's finding
that there are "confidential" and "non confidential" portions of mediation. R178.
The plain language of § 78-3 lb-8 states that mediation is confidential. The statute
does not distinguish between aspects of mediation as the trial court found or as Mr.
Reese argues. Instead, all mediation discussions are treated as equally
confidential.
Furthermore, both the trial court and Mr. Reese ignore the fact that the Utah
Court of Appeals has previously ruled that mediation discussions are confidential
and did not distinguish between "confidential" and "non -confidential" portions of
mediation in making its ruling. In Lyons v. Booker, 982 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App.
1999), the Utah Court of Appeals addressed the confidentiality of statements made
during a court-ordered mediation. In that case, the parties had been sent to
mediation on appeal. See id. at 1143. The Appellant subsequently filed a motion
with the appeals court seeking to enforce an agreement allegedly reached during
mediation or, in the alternative, for return of monies tendered in furtherance of
settlement. See id. The Court of Appeals refused to hear the motion on the
ground that it does not hear new evidence. See id. The issue regarding the
enforcement of the settlement was remanded to the trial court for hearing. See id
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at 1143-44. The Court of Appeals discussed at length the procedure to be
followed on remand. See id. at 1144.
The Court stated as follows:
In the course of proceedings on remand, pursuant to the
prior order of this court, neither counsel nor parties may
disclose to any court, in argument, briefs, or otherwise,
statements or comments made during the initial
mediation conference or in related discussions involving
the appellate mediator thereafter. We interpret this
prohibition to apply equally to notes or other memoranda
of such statements or comments. This restriction applies
with equal force to the appellate mediator in the unlikely
event that she should be asked to participate in any way
in the proceeding on remand.

IdL at 1144 (footnote omitted)(emphasis original). The Court in Lyons stated,
"' guarantee of confidentiality is essential to the proper functioning of a . . .
settlement conference program.'" Id. at 114 (quoting Clark v. Stapleton Corp., 957
F.2d 745, 746 (10th Cir. 1992)). "'[Participants must trust that matters discussed
at a conference will not be revealed to the judges.'" Id.
The same reasoning applies to the case at bar. Mr. Reese, in error, revealed
to the trial court the content of confidential settlement negotiations between LWP,
himself and Tingey. Pursuant to the reasoning in Lyons, Mr. Reese may not rely
upon such evidence in pursuing his motion and may be admonished or sanctioned
by the Court for doing so.
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LWP agreed to participate in the mediation between Tingey and Mr. Reese
because it realized that its lien would impact settlement between the parties. It
negotiated in good faith throughout the mediation, but a resolution was not
reached. That LWP failed to sign any written agreement drafted by Mr. Reese is
conclusive evidence that no agreement was reached. R88. LWP agreed to
participate in this mediation because it trusted that all statements made therein
would be kept confidential unless agreed to by the parties.
Thus, the trial court erred in interpreting § 78 -3 lb-8 as not prohibiting the
introduction of evidence to prove a purported oral agreement reached during
mediation. "Matters of statutory construction . . . are questions of law that" are
"review[ed] for correctness." Anderson v. United Parcel Service, 96 P.3d 903,
906 (Utah 2004). Accordingly, this Court need provide no deference to the trial
court's interpretation of § 78 -3 lb-8. The plain language of § 78-3 lb-8(4) provides
that all participants to mediation are bound by the obligation and benefit of
confidentiality. Similarly, there is no language in the statute that supports the trial
court's distinguishing between "confidential" and "non -confidential" mediation
discussions. The trial court's interpretation of § 78-3 lb-8 is in error and should be
reversed.
Interestingly, Mr. Reese does not dispute that Lyons v. Booker, 982 P.2d at
1143, is binding precedent that mediation discussions must remain confidential.
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Mr. Reese merely states that LWP's counsel is not ordered to discuss confidential
mediation discussion, but instead, is ordered to discuss non-confidential mediation
discussions. R213:14:9-24. This argument begs the question and ignores that the
Utah Legislature, in § 78-3 lb-8, and the Utah Court of Appeals, in Lyons, have
determined that all mediation discussions are confidential.
Mr. Reese also argues that the trial court provided sufficient guidance
regarding LWP's counsel's deposition because it directed that counsel need only
testify about "non-confidential" statements. This begs the question of which
statements are confidential. Moreover, the trial court has put LWP's counsel in the
awkward and unnecessary position of being a witness in her own case. It is not
clear the extent to which the trial court has abrogated the rule of confidentiality in
mediations. By ruling that there are "confidential" and "non-confidential"
components to mediation, the trial court has created a dispute in each case where
mediation does not result in a written settlement agreement. It is now unclear what
statements during mediation will be given protection and which ones will not since
"the content of the mediation, including the process of the mediation and
conversations and agreements that were made in the mediation" are discoverable.
R179. The trial court's rule is unworkable. This is why § 78-3lb-8 is most
reasonably interpreted as a "bright line" rule that all mediation discussions are
confidential.
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If the trial court's ruling is allowed to stand, it would be unclear where the
line will be drawn regarding discovery into discussions from a mediation. Will the
mediator be compelled to testify in direct opposition to his or her oath? Will
statements made by attorneys during mediation be discoverable and used at trial?
Should LWP be allowed to depose Mr. Reese's attorney regarding the mediation?
Should the attorneys be disqualified from representing their clients if they must
testify regarding discussion in a mediation? Should written discovery regarding
mediation be allowed? These questions highlight that the decision t o require
LWP's attorney to be deposed is a procedural error that has far reaching
ramifications. The rules of mediation require confidentiality and require that
agreements reached in mediation be reduced to writing so as to render these
questions moot.
B. Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution Makes
Clear that the Agreements Made In Mediations Must Be Reduced to
Writing to be Enforceable.
"Statutory Construction is a question of law and is reviewed by the Court de
novo. When interpreting court rules, we apply our rules of statutory construction
with an understanding that rules, like statutes, are passed as a whole and not in
parts or sections. [0]ur primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the
rule-making body and to render all parts [of the rule] relevant and meaningful."
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Cox v. Krammer, 76 P.3d 184, 187 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (internal quotations and
citations omitted)(alterations original).
L

Rule 101 of the Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative
Dispute Resolution Requires That Agreements be Reduced to
Writing.

Mr. Reese improperly relies upon confidential statements and comments
made during the course of the mediation to support his claim that an oral
agreement was reached. The plain language of Rule 101 of the Utah Rules of
Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution mandates that agreements reached
during mediation be reduced to writing. vcRule 101 provides:
[I]n the event that a settlement to all issues is reached
during the mediation conference, the participat ing parties
or the mediator shall prepare, and the parties shall
execute, a written settlement agreement and resolution of
the action. In the event that a resolution of less than all
of the issues is reached, the parties shall prepare and
execute a stipulation concerning those issues that were
resolved and identifying those issues that remain in
dispute.
Id. This language unequivocally requires that agreements " shall" be reduced to
writing. Id. Here, LWP refused to execute the document presented to it because it
contained a term to which it did not agree. The agreement (if any) was not reduced
to writing and is not enforceable pursuant to the plain language of Rule 101.
Moreover, such an interpretation of Rule 101 is consistent with other
provisions of the rule that allow parties to disengage from mediation at any point
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prior to when a document is signed. Rule 101 states in relevant part, "During the
pre-mediation conference, the mediator shall inform the parties of their right to
withdraw from the mediation process before a final settlement agreement is
signed." Rule 10 L supra. (Emphasis added).
Here, LWP informed all involved, before a final settlement was signed, that
no agreement had been reached. LWP exercised its right to "withdraw from the
mediation process" at a point prior to the execution of a written document. Id
LWP acted within the power granted it via Rule 101 when it refused to sign the
proposed "Memorandum of Understanding" because it contained a term to which it
did not agree. In essence, LWP disengaged from the mediation process without
reaching a resolution.
Lastly, Rule 101 provides that "[t]he mediation conference should proceed
in a fashion that furthers the goal of the mediation process, preserves
confidentiality, and encourages candor on the part of the participating parties." Id
Obviously, the rule intended for all discussions within mediation to remain
confidential. There is no distinction made between "confidential" and "non confidential" portions of the mediation as the trial court and Mr. Reese advance.
LWP acknowledges that requiring, parties to draft and execute a "complete"
settlement agreement at the close of each mediation would be an unreasonable
burden; however, it is within custom and practice (and the abili ty of the parties) to
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reduce the essential terms to writing and have all participants execute the
document. The plain language of Rule 101 mandates this course of action.
Here, it became clear when reviewing the "Memorandum of Understanding"
drafted by the mediator that the document contained a term to which LWP did not
agree. R88. It was for this reason that LWP's counsel refused to sign the
document. R88. Pursuant to Rule 101, LWP is free to withdraw from the
mediation process at any time prior to execution of the written settlement
agreement. Id Most importantly, LWP immediately made it clear to all the parties
involved that the written document contained a term to which it did not agree.
LWP informed the Plaintiff, the Defendant and the mediator prior to the end of the
mediation that LWP would not execute the written settlement agreement because it
contained a term to which it did not agree. R88. It would be unconscionable for
LWP to be bound to an agreement to which it did not agree.
2.

Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence Plainly States That
Statements Made in Settlement Negotiations Are Not Admissible
Evidence.

Utah Rule of Evidence Rule 408, which is identical to the federal rule,
excludes from evidence statements made in the course of settlement negotiations.
Mr. Reese, Tingey Construction, LWP and each of their respective counsels
participated in a mediation for the purpose of settlement of this suit. No statements
or comments made by any of the parties to the mediation can be submitted as
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evidence to the Court. All such evidence in the moving papers and supporting
affidavits should be stricken.
The cornerstone of the mediation process is that all discussions that occur
within the mediation are confidential. This promotes open dialo gue and,
hopefully, settlement of the suit. Mr. Reese cited several cases to the trial court in
its motion to enforce this purported settlement agreement but what Mr. Reese
failed to note was that not one of the cases that he referenced as a basis for
enforcing an oral agreement dealt with mediation. Mr. Reese has provided no
legal support for his claim that an oral agreement (if one was actually reached,
which LWP Solutions denies) can be enforced in the context of a mediation. The
reason no such case exists, is because the rules regarding mediation are clearly set
forth and require a written agreement in order for it to be binding. Otherwise, the
rules would not allow for a party to a mediation to withdraw from the mediation at
any given point in time prior to the execution of a written document. What
Plaintiff fails to recognize is that when a party participates in a mediation, that
party voluntarily suspends its constitutional right to a jury trial. Requiring a
written agreement at the close of a mediation is a "safety net" that allows parties
only to knowingly waive their right to a jury trial. This reasoning is supported by
cases found in other jurisdictions.
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C.

Courts from Other Jurisdictions Likewise Treat Mediations as
Confidential and This Court Should Follow Its Own Precedent
and The Lead of Other Jurisdictions and Find All Mediation
Discussions Confidential and Oral Agreements Not Enforceable.

In Vernon v. Action, 732 N.E.2d 805, 806 (Ind. 2000), the Supreme Court of
Indiana addressed whether an agreement allegedly reached in a mediation, but not
reduced to writing, was enforceable. The court concluded that "the mediator's
testimony regarding the alleged oral settlement agreement was confidential and
privileged and that it was not admissible pursuant to the A.D.R. Rules incorporated
in the parties' written agreement to mediate." Id. at 806.
In Vernon, the parties participated in a voluntary pre-suit mediation pursuant
to a written agreement that established the conditions of the me diation. "The
agreement required confidentiality in conformity with state law and Supreme Court
Rule," id at 807 (footnote omitted), and incorporated the A.D.R. Rules.6 An
agreement was allegedly reached during the mediation but later the plaintiff denied
the existence of such agreement. See id. at 806. The defendants filed a motion to
6

It appears that the A.D.R. rules do not apply to mediations in Indiana which are
not "instituted pursuant to judicial action in a pending case." Vernon v. Action,
732 N.E.2d 805, 808, fn 5 (Ind. 2000). This inquiry is not relevant here because
this mediation arose from an action pending in the third judicial district court.
Also different from Utah, the A.D.R. rules in Indiana state that '"Mediation shall
be regarded as settlement negotiations as governed by Indiana Evidence Rule
408.'" Id. at 808-09. While LWP argues that settlement discussion within the
confines of mediation are subject to Evidence Rule 408 exclusion, nether the Utah
statutes nor the A.D.R. rules of Utah are as explicit as the Indiana rules on this
point. It is noteworthy, however, that legislatures from this jurisdiction made this
explicit.
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enforce settlement with the trial court. See id. The trial court allowed evidence
from the parties regarding mediation discussion and the insurance adjuster for the
defendant, the mediator, the attorneys and both parties testified about the
mediation. See id. The trial court then concluded that the parties had reached an
agreement during the mediation and enforced such agreement. See id. The
plaintiffs appealed on the grounds that the trial court erred when it admitted the
evidence "in contravention of the parties' mediation agreement, A.D.R. Rule 2.12,
and Indiana Evidence Rule 408." Id.
The Indiana Supreme Court noted that "in general, settlement agreements
need not be in writing to be enforceable. However, when a settlement is reached in
mediation, the mediation rules require that 'it shall be reduced to writing and
signed.'" Id at 809 (internal citations omitted). The court noted that "[bjecause of
the nature of the mediation process and its significant and increasing role,
considerable attention has been given to whether claims of oral mediation
settlement agreements should be enforceable." See id. Relying upon comments
made by participants at the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Law, the appellate court acknowledged that the written agreement reached by
participants was exempt from confidentiality requirements, however, oral
statements made during the mediation were not exempt. See id. The Court
reasoned as follows:
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[The exception from confidentiality for a final written
document] is noteworthy only for what it does not
include: oral agreements. The disadvantage of
exempting oral settlements is that nearly everything said
during a mediation session could bear on either whether
the disputants came to an agreement or the content of the
agreement. In other words, an exception for oral
agreements has the potential to swallow the rule. As a
result, mediation participants might be less candid, not
knowing whether a controversy later would erupt over an
oral agreement. . . . However, because the majority of
courts and statutes limit the confidentiality exception to
signed written agreements, one would expect that
mediators and others will soon incorporated knowledge
of a writing requirement into their practices.
Id. at 809-10 (citations omitted); see also Uniform Mediation Act, Section
6(a)(l)(2001) at http: //www.pon.harvard.edu/guests/uma/UMAfinal.pdf.
The Vernon Court adopted this reasoning. See id. The appellate court
acknowledged the "importance of ensuring the enforceability of agreements that
result from mediation," but it found other goals to be more important "including:
facilitating agreements that result from mutual ass ent, achieving complete
resolutions of disputes, and producing clear understandings that the parties are less
likely to dispute or challenge." Id at 810. The court reasoned that the goals of
promoting settlement was "fostered by disfavoring oral agreem ents." Id.
"Requiring written agreements, signed by the parties, is more likely to maintain
mediation as a viable avenue for clear and enduring dispute resolution rather than
one leading to further uncertainty and conflict." Id; see also Clark v. Stapleton
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Corp., 957 F.2d 745, 746 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that for federal mediation
program to work "participants must trust that matters discussed at a conference
will not be revealed to the judges.")
Similarly, in In re Acceptance Insurance Company, 33 S.W.3d 443 (Tex.
Civ. App. 2000), the court entertained a writ of mandamus to address the error of
allowing parties to testify at trial regarding confidential mediation discussions.
Relying upon a Texas statute, the court held that "communications made by a
participant to mediation relating to the subject matter of the dispute are
'confidential, [are] not subject to disclosure, and may not be used as evidence
against the participant in any judicial or administrative proceeding."' Id at 452
(citations omitted)(modifications original). The court concluded that "[t]he trial
court. .. abused its discretion by violating the confidentiality provisions of the
ADR Act in requiring realtor's representative to testify about the manner in which
she negotiated and her communications with other participants and with other
representatives of realtor during the mediations." Id at 454; compare to Reno v.
Haler, 734 N.E.2d 1095, 1099 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (Where agreement within
confines of mediation was enforced because the mediator had taken handwritten
notes and the parties signed these notes in lieu of a more formal document, but still
requiring some form of writing that "contain the terms to which the parties
agreed".); Spencer v. Spencer. 72 N.E.2d 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (where
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agreement within confines of mediation that was dictated by mediator at the end of
the mediation but one party thought she would be given the chance to review this
dictation prior to signature was found not enforceable until it had been si gned by
the parties).
In Wilmington Hospital L.L.C. v. New Castle County, 788 A.2d 536 (Del.
Ch. 2001), a hotel corporation brought suit against a county that refused to issue a
certificate of occupancy. The parties mediated the dispute. Id. at 539 - 40.
Subsequently, the hotel sought to enforce a settlement agreement that it claimed
was reached in the mediation. The court relied upon local court rule to find that
statements made in mediation were confidential and could not be relied upon by
the party seeking to enforce the purported settlement agreement. Id at 540. The
court noted that the party seeking to enforce the settlement, "improperly introduces
and relies on confidential written and oral communications made in connection
with the mediation." Id at 541. The court further noted that "it is inconsistent
with the public policy favoring voluntary mediation for a court to entertain a
motion to enforce a mediation settlement agreement that is not reduced to writing
and signed by the parties to the mediation and the mediator." Id The court
continued that "[confidentiality of all communications between parties or among
them and the mediator serves the important public policy of promoting a broad
discussion of potential resolutions. .. .Without the expectation of confidentiality,
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parties would hesitate to propose compromise solutions out of concern that they
would later be prejudiced by their disclosure." Id Finally, the court stated as
follows: "[I]t is consistent with the purpose of Rule 174 to interpret subpart (g)
thereof as requiring that any settlement agreement between the parties to the
mediation be reduced to writing and signed by them and the mediator as a
condition for enforceability. As this proceeding itself well illustrates, it is
reasonable to expect that such a bright-line rule is the best way to protect the
confidentiality of the mediation when disputes arise over the terms of a putative
settlement." Id at 542-42.
In Ryan v. Garcia, 33 Cal.Rpt.2d 158, 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), purchasers
of a home who had sued for negligent construction and fraud sought to enforce a
purported oral agreement reached during mediation. It appears that the mediator
spoke with each party separately and only combined the group to announce t hat a
settlement had been reached. See id. at 160. During this "joint" session, someone
(not identified) recited the terms of the settlement and defendant's attorney was
asked to reduce the agreement to writing. See id. However, "the parties later
disagreed concerning the terms of the settlement and no written agreement was
ever executed." Id. at 1008.
The court in Ryan considered whether the oral agreement to settle could be
enforced. The court held that'"Confidentiality is absolutely essential to
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mediation." IdL at 161 (citations omitted). "'Otherwise, parties would be reluctant
to make the kinds of concessions and admissions that pave the way to settlement.'"
Id. The party seeking to enforce the purported agreement argued that only
statements "'in the course of mediation'" are protected and not statements made at
the conclusion of the mediation. IcL (Citations omitted). The court was not
persuaded and rejected the suggestion that it was suppose to decide which portions
of the mediation were confidential and which were not. See id. The Court stated
as follows:
Judicial sifting of statements made at a confidential
mediation to select those which can be used as evidence
of an agreement contravenes the legislative intent
underlying adoption [of ADR rules.] Indeed, the risk of
this judicial sifting would deter some litigants from
participating freely and openly in mediation. . . .To
condone further judicial proceedings to enforce oral
agreements made during mediation directly undercuts the
effect of the statute intended by the Legislature.
By using the broad phrase "in the course of the
mediation" the Legislature manifested its intent to protect
a broach range of statements from later use as evidence
in litigation. To establish arbitrary bound aries within the
general process of'mediation/with a vague delineation
between what is included and what is not included, is
contrary to that intent and may not be inferred from the
language of the statute.
Furthermore, narrow interpretation woul d lead the
trial courts to filer the mediation proceedings to
determine if any portion of the proceeding crossed the
line [into non-confidential]. This is the type of disclosure
and use of statements made in mediation the
confidentiality statute is meant to preclude.
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Id at 161.
Most importantly, the court noted that if oral mediation settlements were
enforceable, it would be "costly and time-consuming." Id at 162. Allowing for
oral mediation settlement "permits full-blown trials to determine, in each
mediation case, if there was an oral agreement and, if so, on what terms. [The
ADR rules], however, provide[] broad confidentiality in the expectation of
alleviating the need for ponderous judicial proceedings." Id; see also Regents of
the University of California v. Sumner, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (noting that oral discussion after mediation had concluded was not subject to
the same confidentiality protections as statements within mediation).
As is clear from each of these cases, courts from other jurisdictions believe
that allowing enforcement of disputed oral agreements contravenes the public
policy behind mediation.7 As proposed by the court in Wilmington Hospital, a
"bright-line" approach is most prudent. Failure to draw such a bright-line will put
the trial court in the role as evaluator of mediation discussions so as to distinguish
between those things which are confidential and those which are not. The district
court in this case proposed that very rule in this case. As these courts in
7

Obviously, there is no prohibition against the voluntary adherence to an oral
agreement reached in mediation when there is no dispute between the parties.
However, it is unlikely that court intervention would ever be necessary if the
parties had no dispute so this question is unlikely to arise and is not before the
court here.
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Wilmington Hospital, Ryan, Vernon and In re Acceptance, eloquently stated, this
is an unworkable rule.
IX.

Conclusion

For each of the foregoing reasons, the trial court's order that Mr. Reese
could introduce evidence to support an alleged ora 1 agreement reached in
mediation and that LWP's counsel could be deposed regarding confidential
mediation discussions is in error and should be reversed. Section 78 -3 lb-8
provides that all mediation discussions are confidential and does not allow for an
exception to this confidentiality to prove the existence of an alleged oral
agreement. Similarly, § 78-3 lb-8 does not make a distinction between
"confidential" and "non-confidential" mediation discussions. LWP respectfully
requests that the trial court be reversed and that this matter be remanded to the trial
court with direction that Mr. Reese's motion to enforce be dismissed with
prejudice for lack of admissible evidence in support thereof.
X. Oral Argument
This matter presents a matter of first impression for the Utah Supreme Court as
only the Utah Court of Appeals has issued an opinion regarding the confidentiality
of mediation discussions. See Lyons v. Booker, 982 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App.
1999). For this reason, oral argument on the matter is reque sted.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, on this 10th day of November 2006.

TIM DALTON DUNN, Esq.
S. GRACE ACOSTA, Esq.
DUNN & DUNN, P.C.

505 East 200 South, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 521-6666
Facsimile: (801)521-9998
Attorneys for LWP Solutions
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XL Addendum

Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
§ 78-31b-8. Confidentiality
(1) ADR proceedings shall be conducted in a manner that encourages informal and
confidential exchange among the persons present to facilitate resolution of the
dispute or a part of the dispute. ADR proceedings shall be closed unless the parties
agree that the proceedings be open. ADR proceedings shall not be recorded.
(2) No evidence concerning the fact, conduct, or result of an ADR proceeding may
be subject to discovery or admissible at any subsequent trial of the same case or
same issues between the same parties.
(3) No party to the case may introduce as evidence information obtained during an
ADR proceeding unless the information was discovered from a source
independent of the ADR proceeding.
(4) Unless all parties and the neutral agree, no person attending an ADR
proceeding, including the ADR provider or ADR organization, may disclose or be
required to disclose any information obtained in the course of an ADR proceeding,
including any memoranda, notes, records, or work product.
(5) Except as provided, an ADR provider or ADR organization may not disclose
or discuss any information about any ADR proceeding to anyone outside the
proceeding, including the judge or judges to whom the case may be assigned. An
ADR provider or an ADR organization may communicate information about an
ADR proceeding with the director for the purposes of training, program
management, or program evaluation and when consulting with a peer. In making
those communications, the ADR provider or ADR organization shall render
anonymous all identifying information.
(6) Nothing in this section limits or affects the responsibility to report child abuse
or neglect in accordance with Section 62A-4a-403.
(7) No records of ADR proceedings under this act [FN1] or under Title 78,
Chapter 31a, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act, shall be subject to Title 63, Chapter 2,
Government Records Access and Management Act, except settlement agreements
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filed with the court after conclusion of an ADR proceeding or awards filed with
the court after the period for filing a demand for trial de novo has expired.
Laws 1994, c. 228, § 10; Laws 2000, c. 288, § 7, eff. July 1, 2000; Laws 2004, c.
90, §96, eff. May 3, 2004.
RULE 408. COMPROMISE AND OFFERS TO COMPROMISE
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or
offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is
likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise
negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is
offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness,
negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal
investigation or prosecution.
RULE 101. CONDUCT OF MEDIATION PROCEEDINGS
(a) Selection of Mediator. The mediator shall be selected as provided in Code of
Judicial Administration Rule 4-510(11).
(b) Pre-mediation Conference. Within 10 days following selection, and after
consultation with the participating parties or their counsel, the mediator shall
conduct a pre-mediation conference and schedule the place, date and time of the
mediation conference. The pre-mediation conference may be conducted by
telephone, with the parties individually, or together. During the pre-mediation
conference, the mediator shall inform the parties of their right to withdraw from
the mediation process before a final settlement agreement is signed. The mediation
conference should be held within 45 days of the pre-mediation conference. The
parties may agree to conduct discovery pursuant to paragraph (f). The mediator
may request that the parties exchange and/or submit a disclosure statement prior to
the mediation conference.
(c) Mediation Conference. The mediation conference shall commence at the
place, date, and time agreed upon by the mediator and the parties. All parties shall
be present, shall be prepared to discuss, and shall have the authority to fully settle,
all relevant issues in the case. The mediator shall conduct the mediation
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conference and determine the length and timing of sessions and recesses, and the
order and manner of presentation of the issues. The mediation conference should
proceed in a fashion that furthers the goals of the mediation process, preserves
confidentiality, and encourages candor on the part of participating parties. The
mediator should serve as a neutral facilitator, assisting the parties in defining and
narrowing the issues and encouraging each party to examine the dispute from
various perspectives, without undertaking to decide any issue, make findings of
fact, or impose any agreement.
(d) Separate Consultation With Parties During the Mediation Conference.
During the mediation conference, the mediator may meet or consult separately
with one or more participating parties, or may divide the conference into groups of
fewer than all the parties. Information disclosed to the mediator on a confidential
basis during separate consultation shall not be disclosed to other parties without
the disclosing partyfs consent.
(e) Settlement. In the event that a settlement to all issues is reached during the
mediation conference, the participating parties or the mediator shall prepare, and
the parties shall execute, a written settlement agreement and promptly file with the
clerk of the court any documents appropriate for resolution of the action. In the
event that a resolution of less than all of the issues is reached, the parties shall
prepare and execute a stipulation concerning those issues that were resolved and
identifying those issues that remain in dispute. Upon filing of the stipulation with
the clerk, the case shall be withdrawn from the ADR program.
(f) Discovery. Discovery may proceed during the pendency of the mediation
proceedings, except as stipulated by the parties. Subpoenas for the production of
evidence by nonparties may be issued, served and enforced by the court as
provided by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(g) Termination. If the mediator determines that the parties are unable to
participate meaningfully in the process or that a reasonable agreement is unlikely
to be achieved, the mediator may suspend or terminate the mediation process
without explanation. The parties may terminate the proceedings at any time.
(h) Absent Parties. Upon written recommendation by the mediator or motion by
any party, the court may order absent parties to show cause why they failed to
attend the mediation conference and, if appropriate, why sanctions should not be
imposed.
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(i) Change to Arbitration. At any time prior to the conclusion of the mediation
proceedings, the parties may agree to submit the matter to arbitration. Written
notice signed by all parties and counsel of such agreement shall be sent to the
Director. Selection of an arbitrator shall be governed by Code of Judicial
Administration Rule 4-510(11). The parties may by agreement request that the
mediator serve as an arbitrator.
(j) No interlocutory appeal may be taken from an order granting or denying a
motion to refer a civil action pending on January 1, 1995 to the ADR program.
[Adopted effective January 1, 1995; amended effective November 1, 1996.]
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I hereby certify that on the 13>th Day of November, 2006, a true and accurate
copy of the Appellate Brief of LWP Solutions, Inc. was served by hand delivery on
the following:
Richard Henricksen
320 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( X ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile (355-0246)

Joseph E. Minnock
Morgan, Minnock, Rice & James
Attornys for Defendant
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( X ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

S. Grace Acosta
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